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Abstract  
We explore the impact of historical preservation policies on domestic energy consumption. 
Using panel data for England from 2006 to 2013 and employing a fixed effects-strategy, we 
document that (i) rising national energy prices induce an increase in home energy efficiency 
installations and a corresponding reduction in energy consumption and (ii) this energy saving 
effect is significantly less pronounced in Conservation Areas and in places with high 
concentrations of Listed Buildings, where the adoption of energy efficiency installations is 
typically more costly and sometimes legally prevented altogether. Preservation policies 
increase private energy costs and the social cost of carbon per designated dwelling by around 
£8,000 and £2,550, respectively. These costs ought to be weighed against any benefits of 
preservation. 
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11. Introduction
Policies to preserve buildings for historical, cultural or architectural reasons are widespread 
across Europe and North America. They generate both benefits and costs. While the external 
benefits—as measured by higher house prices outside of designated areas—have recently 
been well documented (Ahlfeldt et al., forthcoming; Been et al., 2016), we know relatively 
little about the costs these policies may generate. In this paper we quantify the costs in the 
form of foregone energy efficiency savings and the social cost of carbon. We find that they 
are substantial. 
The theoretical mechanism we have in mind is straightforward. In the absence of preservation 
policies, households can be expected to invest in energy efficiency improvements as long as 
the expected private benefits from potential energy savings exceed the additional upfront 
investment costs. Preservation policies drive a wedge into this decision process because they 
often mandate restrictions on the type and extent of changes—both internally and 
externally—that can be made to properties in designated areas. Restrictions on say the types 
of windows that can be installed may increase the cost of adopting energy efficiency 
technologies or, in fact, may legally prevent such installations altogether. Preservation 
policies may thus directly affect the energy efficiency of affected dwellings.  
Our paper quantifies foregone energy efficiency savings by exploring the impact of historical 
preservation policies on domestic energy consumption in England. To do so, we focus on two 
well-established preservation policies: ‘Conservation Areas’ and ‘Listed Buildings’. We 
collate a rich panel dataset at the Middle Layer Super Output Area (MSOA)-level (i.e., the 
neighbourhood-level) that spans the period from 2006 to 2013—a period during which energy 
prices, defined in our paper as a local weighted average of national gas and electricity prices 
per kilowatt hour, rose markedly and per capita energy consumption fell by around 20%.  
Empirically, we exploit the fact that rising national energy prices shift the local demand for 
energy efficiency installations upwards, thereby reducing energy consumption, but less so in 
areas with widespread preservation. We first document that rising national energy prices 
induce a reduction in local energy consumption. Our findings indicate that energy 
consumption in England is fairly price elastic. Next we explore the sensitivity of the price 
elasticity of energy consumption with respect to the incidence of preservation. One difficulty 
in doing this is that buildings in Conservation Areas and Listed Buildings are likely to be 
correlated with income and other confounding factors. To condition out these factors and thus 
focus our analysis on identifying the causal impact of preservation policies on energy 
consumption, we control for location and year fixed effects, linear time-trends interacted with 
neighbourhood characteristics as well as flexible trends for each Travel to Work Area 
(TTWA), and the neighbourhood’s distance from the centre of the TTWA. We also carefully 
control for the age and composition of the housing stock thereby helping us to disentangle the 
effects of preservation policies from vintage or heritage effects. 
Doing this, we demonstrate that the energy saving effect is significantly less pronounced (i.e., 
the elasticity of energy consumption with respect to the energy price is significantly less 
negative) in Conservation Areas and in places with higher concentrations of Listed Buildings, 
consistent with the proposition that preservation policies prevent investments in new 
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elasticity point estimate (-0.48) obtained from our data, our findings suggest that a one 
standard deviation increase in the share of dwellings in an MSOA located in Conservation 
Areas reduces the energy price elasticity at the MSOA-level by 3.5%, while a one standard 
deviation increase in the number of Listed Buildings per 100 dwellings in the MSOA reduces 
the elasticity by 4.4%. We provide evidence that the mechanism for this decline in energy 
price elasticity is the capacity of preservation policies to limit the uptake of home energy 
efficiency improvements.  
Our findings are robust to a host of sensitivity checks. First, we employ an alternative 
estimation approach, a ‘stacked regression’, which allows us to control for all factors that 
commonly affect per capita domestic electricity and gas consumption in each MSOA-year 
cell. Second, we demonstrate that changes in the panel frequency or the lag structure of 
energy prices (which we use to examine households’ expectations of future energy prices as 
drivers of investment decisions) do not materially affect our findings. We conduct further 
sensitivity checks and a placebo test exploring the effect of a preservation policy (Green Belt 
designation) that is not expected to affect energy efficiency investments, and all these tests—
discussed in Appendix A—confirm our findings.  
Our counterfactual simulations suggest that preservation policies in England impose 
additional private energy costs with a present value of around £16 billion and a social cost of 
carbon of around £5.1 billion. With approximately two million designated dwellings in 
England, this equates to £8,000 and £2,550 per designated dwelling, respectively. Limiting 
Conservation Areas and Listed Buildings to 1980 levels—a fairly moderate reversion that 
would bring back levels to a point in time when buildings with the highest heritage value were 
likely already designated—would have lowered total domestic energy consumption in 
England between 2006 and 2013 by 1.3 %. This amounts to a monetary saving over the 8-year 
period of around £1.7 billion and a carbon reduction of 8.9 million metric tons of carbon 
dioxide equivalent. It is important to note that while this decline accounts for a relatively 
small proportion of total domestic energy consumption, the energy saving per affected 
dwelling is substantial. This is because only one out of 10 dwellings in England is protected 
by preservation policies.  
Our paper ties into a recent empirical literature that focuses on the house price effects of 
preservation policies. A study by Ahlfeldt et al. (forthcoming) is perhaps most relevant for 
our investigation because, like us, it focuses on designated Conservation Areas in England. 
Their findings indicate that property price effects inside newly-designated areas are not 
statistically different from zero, yet outside of these areas, the effects are positive and 
significant. In a similar vein, Been et al. (2016) explore preservation policies in New York 
City. They too find that properties just outside the boundaries of historic districts consistently 
increase in value after designation. The effect within these districts is more mixed; sometimes 
positive sometimes zero. Been et al. also document a modest reduction in new construction in 
districts after designation. Finally, Koster et al. (2016) focus on the impact of historic 
amenities on house prices and sorting of households within Dutch cities and document that 
high income households sort themselves into designated areas, suggesting that they have a 
higher willingness to pay for historic amenities.  
3While Ahlfeldt et al. (forthcoming) and Been et al. (2016) both suggest that preservation 
policies significantly increase prices of nearby dwellings, it is important to emphasize that this 
does not necessarily imply that they increase social welfare. First, as argued, for example by 
Glaeser (2011), excessive historic preservation on a wider scale may generate adverse impacts 
through supply restrictions that raise prices in an entire city or even nationwide. Second, there 
are factors other than supply constraints that can drive a wedge between house price 
capitalization effects and the public’s willingness to pay (Kuminoff and Pope, 2014). Positive 
price effects also do not necessarily imply positive net benefits because even internal benefits 
and costs are not always fully capitalized into prices, for example, when the marginal house 
buyer is not well informed about particular benefits or costs associated with the location or 
dwelling (Hilber, 2017).  
Third, and most crucially, research in this area has until now focused on external benefits that 
increase—or external costs that lower—property prices. However, externalities that are not 
capitalised in property prices may also exist. One example of a positive externality is the fact 
that some people’s utility is positively affected by the existence of a historic building—such 
as London’s St. Paul’s Cathedral—even if they do not actually live close by. A negative 
externality may, for example, arise if historic preservation prevents or increases the cost of 
energy efficiency installations, with the resulting growth in energy consumption generating 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions—a global negative externality. Neither the existence value 
of a historic building nor GHG emissions will be capitalised into local property prices.  
Our paper ties into a growing literature on the energy and climate impacts of land use 
regulations. This literature tends to focus more generally on land use restrictions, e.g. Glaeser 
and Kahn (2010), Larson et al. (2012), Larson and Yezer (2015). Glaeser and Kahn (2010) 
document a strong negative association between carbon dioxide emissions and land use 
regulations. They point out that restricting new development in the cleanest areas of the 
United States effectively pushes new development towards places with higher emissions. 
Larson et al. (2012) trace the energy footprint of transportation, housing and land use policies 
in a general equilibrium framework, allowing them to consider feedback or rebound effects 
that work through the urban land market. They find that such effects can lead to 
counterintuitive results. For example, minimum lot zoning may reduce energy consumption 
because it drives up the price of housing and this causes household densities in the 
unregulated inner parts of the city to rise significantly. Finally, Larson and Yezer (2015) 
employ simulations to demonstrate that density limits and greenbelts can positively or 
negatively affect both city welfare and energy use. Our main contribution to this literature is 
the focus on the careful empirical identification of energy consumption effects of historic 
preservation policies. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to evaluate and quantify the 
energy and climate costs of such policies.  
With space heating accounting for around 70% of domestic energy consumption, buildings in 
the UK are responsible for 37% of the country’s GHG emissions. Indeed, urban real estate is a 
major contributor of global GHG emissions (Kahn and Walsh, 2015). Our results suggest 
important implications for climate policy. In the UK, this is guided by the 2008 Climate 
Change Act, which legislates for an ambitious 80% reduction in the country’s GHG emissions 
by 2050. To help meet this target, the Committee on Climate Change suggested in 2008 that 
4the ‘least-cost path’ would entail a major contribution from energy efficiency improvements 
in buildings, including designated dwellings. Our findings indicate that the current extent of 
historic preservation in England signifies an important obstacle to achieving the ambitious 
targets set by the government. More generally, by demonstrating that historic preservation 
policies limit the uptake of home energy efficiency improvements, we contribute to a 
literature that seeks to understand the low apparent uptake of energy efficient durables 
(Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; Fowlie et al., 2015). Another measure by which the UK hopes 
to meet its target is via a carbon tax, known as the Carbon Floor Price. Currently frozen at £18 
per metric ton of carbon dioxide, this is projected to increase 'rapidly' after 2020.1 Our results 
suggest that energy consumers living in designated dwellings are unlikely to respond to a 
rising tax in the same manner as those living in non-designated dwellings.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the institutional setting and provide 
some theoretical considerations. In the subsequent section we describe the data, discuss our 
baseline specifications and present our main empirical results along with robustness checks 
and evidence of a potential mechanism underlying our main results. Section 4 provides a 
quantitative interpretation of our findings by conducting a counterfactual analysis. In Section 
5 we consider welfare implications. The final section concludes. 
2. Institutional Setting and Theoretical Considerations
2.1.  Preservation Policies: Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas 
Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas were established to protect buildings of historical or 
architectural interest. These policies date back to 1953 for Listed Buildings (the Historic 
Buildings and Monuments Act) and 1967 for Conservation Areas (the Civic Amenities Act), 
although the current legislation in England and Wales dates from the Planning (Listed 
Buildings and Conservation Areas) Act 1990. According to Historic England (formerly 
English Heritage),2 Grade I Listed Buildings are of “exceptional interest”, Grade II* are of 
“particular importance” and Grade II are of “special interest”. Less than 0.5% of all Listed 
Buildings were built after 1945; about a third was built in each of the 18th and 19th Centuries. 
Over 90% of all Listed Buildings have Grade II status. Conservation Areas protect whole 
neighbourhoods rather than individual dwellings, and Listed Buildings can be found in 
Conservation Areas.  
Figure 1 shows the distribution of Conservation Areas in England from data collected by 
Historic England in 2008 and 2012, at the Local Planning Authority (LPA) scale. The time 
trend in the total number of Conservation Areas since the late-1960s is shown in Figure 2, 
based on the same data. There are currently just over 8,000 such areas, containing around two 
million dwellings, out of a total housing stock of some 23 million dwellings as of 2014. The 
1970s and 1980s witnessed rapid growth in the designation of new Conservation Areas before 
tailing off in the 1990s. Similar to Conservation Areas, Listed Buildings, including dwellings 
and non-dwellings, are distributed all over England, particularly in the East and South-East 
(Figure 3). After rapid growth in the 1980s, the designation of new Listed Buildings also 
1 This was announced as part of the UK's 2015 Summer Budget. See: http://www.carbonbrief.org/budget-2015-
key-climate-and-energy-announcements. 
2 See: https://historicengland.org.uk/listing/what-is-designation/listed-buildings/. 
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the 2010s. 
2.2.  The Role of Preservation Policies for Home Energy Efficiency Improvements  
and Implications for Energy Consumption 
Preservation policies protect the heritage of the built environment by restricting the 
development or modernisation of specific dwellings. The policies’ economic rationale centres 
on the external value of heritage, which is often enjoyed by individuals other than those 
owning or occupying designated dwellings. It may too solve coordination failure.3 However, 
preservation policies may also impose costs, both private and social. Private costs materialise 
for example when households living in designated dwellings incur additional costs in order to 
comply with preservation policy standards. Households are also typically restricted in the 
extent to which they can reconfigure, redevelop, or alter the fabric of preserved buildings. 
One particular implication of preservation-induced restrictions—the focus of this paper—is 
that they may impede energy efficiency installations and thus increase private energy costs 
and the social costs associated with negative externalities.  
Table 1 illustrates the main restrictions on undertaking specific energy efficiency 
improvements for dwellings affected by each of the English preservation policies. In many 
Conservation Areas, planning consents are required for external improvement projects. For 
example, many Conservation Areas are subject to locally imposed so-called Article 4 
Directions, which limit specific development rights such as making changes to windows or 
frontages. In contrast, outside Conservation Areas external improvement projects do not 
require planning permission (i.e., they are ‘permitted developments’). For Listed Buildings, 
the requirements are much stricter and also cover internal upgrades, e.g. cavity wall 
insulation. The planning guidance even suggests that households living in a Listed Building 
should consult with planning authorities before installing a new heating system or boiler.  
Some restrictions imposed by preservation policies may not prevent home energy efficiency 
improvements altogether but are likely to drive up homeowners’ costs. For instance, a 
homeowner living in a Conservation Area wishing to install new, energy-efficient windows 
may need to ensure that they are consistent not only with the character of the owner’s 
dwelling but also with the character of the surrounding buildings. In some cases, this could 
oblige owners to install expensive timber windows, rather than much less costly and more 
energy-efficient aluminium or uPVC windows.4  
We can illustrate the underlying theoretical mechanism we have in mind and the implications 
for the demand price elasticity and resulting energy consumption using a simple demand-
supply framework. Figure 5 depicts two markets: A local energy market (Panel A) and a local 
3 As Holman and Ahlfeldt (2015) point out, even if heritage value is fully capitalised into property prices, 
coordination failure is likely. That is, individual homeowners may be tempted to inappropriately alter their 
property, thus free-riding on the historic character of nearby properties. Government intervention in the form of 
designating Conservation Areas may solve a sort of prisoner’s dilemma, in which it may be rational for owners 
in historic districts to collectively restrict their own property rights without the possibility of compensation. 
4 Timber windows will usually be about twice as expensive as uPVC alternatives. In a public consultation about 
a Conservation Area in London, residents opposing the Conservation Area policy of timber replacement 
windows quoted replacement costs for a single timber window of £4,000 to £5,000, https://www.harrow.gov.uk/ 
www2/documents/s61817/Revised%20PWPE_Appendix1.pdf.  
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shock to energy supply (e.g., a sudden decrease in oil and/or gas production) that raises the 
national energy price	݌௘. In Panel A of Figure 5 this equates to an upward shift of the energy 
supply curve and a corresponding increase in the price of energy. In the absence of 
preservation policies, local energy consumers will respond to this shock in two ways. First, 
the price increase will provide greater incentives to save more energy (e.g. by turning down 
the heating thermostat or by turning off electronic equipment when not in use). Second, the 
price increase provides greater incentives to invest in home energy efficiency installations as 
it makes such installations more beneficial. In the market for home energy efficiency 
installations—depicted in Panel B of Figure 5—this equates to an increase in the demand for 
such installations, resulting in greater energy efficiency (and consequently less energy 
consumption, all else equal).  
Now consider an identical consumer (with identical utility function) who lives in an identical 
neighbourhood with identical housing stock. There is only one difference: for illustrative 
purposes we assume that this neighbourhood has a strict preservation policy that prevents new 
home energy efficiency installations altogether, implying a perfectly inelastic supply curve—
illustrated in Panel B of Figure 5—in the market for such installations. Even though the 
energy price shock will also induce an increase in demand for installations, the strict 
preservation policy prevents more installations and consequently prevents an increase in 
energy efficiency. Energy consumers in the preserved neighbourhood will still reduce their 
energy consumption, but less so, all else equal, than consumers who live in the non-preserved 
location. In the energy market this results in consumers in the preserved location having a 
more price inelastic demand for energy (as illustrated in Panel A of Table 5). The supply price 
shock will induce additional energy savings—effect  in the figure—but not an additional 
reduction of energy consumption as a consequence of additional energy efficiency 
installations—effect  in the figure. The reduction in energy consumption (effects +) 
will be greater for consumers in the non-preservation neighbourhood, by the amount of . In 
the next section we derive an identification strategy that takes advantage of a national energy 
price shock and spatial differences in the extent to which neighbourhoods in England are 
treated by preservation policies, allowing us to test the prediction that energy consumption of 
households living in neighbourhoods with stricter preservation policies will respond less 
strongly to given energy price shocks. 
3. Empirical Analysis
After describing the data used in our analysis, we present our identification strategy to assess 
the extent to which preservation policies impact energy consumption and domestic 
investments in energy efficiency. Next we present our main result, i.e., preservation policies 
reduce energy price elasticities, and various robustness checks. Finally, we demonstrate that 
preservation policies limit the uptake of energy efficiency improvements, consistent with a 
decline in the energy price elasticity being driven by such policies. 
3.1. Data 
There is currently no dataset, at least not for England, that combines—or could combine—
domestic energy consumption, the prevalence of preservation policies, and the uptake of 
7home energy efficiency installations at the same geographic scale. Therefore, we focus our 
empirical analysis at two different spatial scales by constructing two panels for the period 
2006-2013. The first combines measures of the prevalence of preservation policies with home 
energy consumption at MSOA-level, while the second combines the same policy measures, 
but with measures of the uptake of home energy efficiency installations at LPA-level. We 
briefly describe the data below and display summary statistics for the two panels in Tables 2a 
and 2b. Appendix B provides full details for the underlying datasets. 
The first panel describes domestic energy consumption per person, prevalence of historical 
preservation policies, and various control variables at the MSOA-level. MSOAs are small 
area statistical units (i.e., neighbourhoods) introduced after the 2001 Census, each containing 
between 2,000 and 6,000 households. Domestic energy consumption per person is generated 
at the MSOA-spatial scale by linking sub-national consumption statistics data from the 
Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) to annual population data from the 
Office of National Statistic (ONS). Our dependent variable sums energy consumption across 
electricity and mains gas—the two fuel types available at the MSOA-level.5  
The second panel is constructed at LPA-level by combining data on home energy efficiency 
installations from the Home Energy Efficiency Database (HEED) held by the Energy Saving 
Trust with our measures of preservation policies and control variables. Since counts of home 
energy efficiency installations are not available at a finer spatial scale, by necessity the spatial 
units in this panel are England’s 354 pre-2009 LPAs.6 This panel runs only from 2006 to 
2010. The HEED data records a variety of installations including wall insulations, loft 
insulations, double glazing, new boilers, new heating systems, micro-generation and energy 
efficient lighting. We treat these installations as a stock-measure (because the upgrades we 
focus on are durable) and specify dependent variables based on installations in levels, 
controlling for household counts.  
Since the HEED data do not contain domestic energy consumption, we utilise a third panel 
dataset to illustrate the impact of some of the most common types of home energy efficiency 
installations on domestic energy consumption. The National Energy Efficiency Database 
(NEED)—compiled by DECC between 2005 and 2012—does not contain geographical 
identifiers at the dwelling scale. This precludes it from further analysis with respect to 
preservation policies. NEED contains data for energy consumption and some household and 
dwelling characteristics, including measures of fuel poverty, for almost four million dwellings 
in England.7  
5 A small number of MSOAs have energy consumption figures that imply infeasibly large year-to-year changes 
in energy consumption. These could plausibly result from measurement error or rare factors we are unable to 
fully capture e.g. new connections to the gas pipeline. To ensure these outliers do not drive our results, in our 
main regressions we drop MSOA-year cells where domestic energy consumption, gas, or electricity consumption 
are missing or change by more than 25% between years. Together these cells comprise around 2.5% of our 
original sample. As we show later, this strategy is conservative: estimates increase in magnitude when these 
outliers are retained. 
6 Given missing Conservation Areas data for some LPAs, we are only able to run regressions on 304 of the 354 
LPAs.   
7 See: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/437093/National_Energy_ 
Efficiency_ Data-Framework__NEED__Main_Report.pdf. 
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panels and the corresponding empirical specifications we estimate. In both cases, the demand 
shifters we utilise are based on the national real price of domestic energy per kilowatt hour 
(kWh) provided in DECC Quarterly Energy Prices publications. We use these national prices 
in a number of ways, but in our main specifications we lag prices by a year because domestic 
energy consumers are arguably likely to take time to respond to changes in energy prices, for 
example, in order to select and install energy efficiency measures.8  
National gas and electricity prices are weighted by the local share of each type of energy 
consumed in 2005. Using national energy prices as a shifter of the demand for energy 
efficiency installations has two advantages. First, national prices can be considered exogenous 
from the perspective of property owners and for the purpose of our empirical analysis. 
Second, there is no block energy pricing in the UK, which allows us to sidestep problems due 
to simultaneity between prices and consumption.9 We also note that there is little apparent 
spatial variation in the cost of gas and electricity within the UK, presumably because 
consumers are able to switch between suppliers. National gas and electricity prices along with 
North Sea gas production are illustrated in Figure 6. Prices for electricity and mains gas 
remained relatively flat in real terms between 1990 and 2003 before rising rapidly until 2013. 
The rise in energy prices coincided with a dramatic decline in North Sea gas production as 
profitable reserves dwindled.  
Our principal preservation policy variables are based on the estimated proportion of 
residential addresses in each MSOA or LPA that are covered by each of the policies. For both, 
the denominator is calculated from counts of residential addresses for each postcode in 
England from the Postcode Address File (PAF) contained in the 2010 National Statistics 
Postcode Directory. For Listed Buildings the numerator is the count of Grade II Listed 
Buildings in the MSOA or LPA.10 For Conservation Areas the numerator is calculated by 
allocating postcodes to polygons using shapefiles provided by Historic England and the 
postcode centroid. Alternative measures used in the robustness checks are constructed in a 
similar way from the same underlying data (see Appendices A and B). 
3.2. Identification Strategy 
We aim to test empirically the extent to which historical preservation policies influence 
domestic energy consumption per capita and investments in home energy efficiency 
installations. Our focus is on dynamic effects because historical preservation policies may 
restrict the ability of households to install energy efficiency measures or make such 
installations more expensive. Additionally, dynamic effects are arguably more policy relevant 
because: (i) the Climate Change Act focuses on reducing GHG emissions from current levels 
and new buildings comprise a tiny proportion of the overall housing stock, and; (ii) the strong 
8 We justify the choice of a one-year lag in Section 3.3, and empirically test alternative lag assumptions when 
estimating elasticities in our robustness checks (Section 3.5). 
9 See Ito (2014) and Reiss and White (2005) for recent contributions that discuss how non-linear pricing 
schedules can cause problems in the estimation of energy demand elasticities and ways to resolve these issues. 
10 We use Grade II Listed Buildings only and not the higher grades (Grade II* and Grade I) because these are 
more likely to be buildings which are not in residential use e.g. churches. The resulting measure – Grade II 
Listed Buildings per 100 dwellings –  proxies for the local prevalence of Listed residential Buildings which we 
are unable to observe directly. 
9growth in energy prices in our panel timeframe —shown in Figure 6— could potentially 
mimic the effects of a rising carbon tax, similar to the projected, incremental increases in the 
Carbon Floor Price described in the Introduction.11  
The empirical set-up we adopt is consistent across the two (MSOA- and LPA-scale) panels to 
the extent feasible. We focus on describing the research design for the neighbourhood- level 
analysis of domestic energy consumption per capita, indicating any differences for the LPA 
home energy efficiency panel below. This neighbourhood level panel is composed of all 
MSOAs in England (indexed by subscript i) spanning the years 2006 to 2013 (indexed by 
subscript t).  
We first estimate the following specification to obtain benchmark estimates of the energy 
price elasticity:  
e௜௝௥௧ ൌ βଵp௧ି௠ ൅ αଵw௝௧ ൅ αଶhdd௧ ൅ γ௜ ൅ ∑ δ௥D௥ଽ௥ୀଵ t ൅ ε௜௝௥௧ (1)
This specification regresses the natural log of domestic energy consumption per capita ݁௜௝௥௧ 
on the log national weighted real energy price demand shifter lagged by m periods ݌௧ି௠ and 
on MSOA fixed effects γ୧. Following the literature (e.g., Aroonruengsawat et al., 2012) we 
also include a measure of logged local wages w௝௧ (measured at the LPA level (denoted  j) 
since time-varying wage data are not available at the MSOA-level), and national atmospheric 
conditions measured by log heating degree days hdd௧ to reflect that local income and weather 
conditions may influence domestic energy consumption. Since energy prices vary at the 
national level, we are unable to include year fixed effects in this regression. Instead, we allow 
for regional trends by interacting linear time trends with dummy indicators for the nine 
English regions, denoted	D௥. Our theoretical priors are that, all else equal, consumers will 
respond to higher energy prices by reducing energy consumption so that the price elasticity 
will be negative (βଵ ൏ 0ሻ.     
In subsequent regressions we explore the effect of preservation policies on price elasticities 
by interacting the energy price demand shifter ݌௧ି௠ with time invariant measures of local 
preservation policies, denoted  List࢏ and CA࢏ and collected by Historic England between 2008 
and 2012. Spatial differences in these measures provide the main source of variation from 
which we obtain results. For ease of interpretation, the planning variables are standardised by 
centring on the mean and dividing by the standard deviation throughout. Because our goal is 
to estimate the effect of preservation policies on energy price elasticities rather than the 
elasticities themselves, we henceforth include year fixed effects γ୲ (which subsume national 
heating degree days as well as national energy prices) to control for previously unaccounted 
factors at the national level, e.g. macroeconomic conditions and national policy changes to 
subsidise energy efficiency, as follows: 
  e௜௝௥௧ ൌ βଶp௧ି௠ ൈ List௜ ൅ βଷp௧ି௠ ൈ	CA௜ ൅ αଵw௝௧ ൅ γ௧ ൅ γ௜ ൅ ∑ δ௥D௥ଽ௥ୀଵ t ൅ ε௜௝௥௧ (2) 
This specification can be used to test whether the prevalence of preservation policies 
conditions local energy demand responses to price changes. The coefficient βଵ estimated in 
11 Note that carbon taxes may be more salient, i.e. may yield a larger change in demand, than equivalent 
movements in the market price of gasoline, at least in the short-run (see Rivers and Schaufele, 2015).  
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equation (1) above can be interpreted as the elasticity of domestic energy consumption with 
respect to real unit energy prices. Since we standardise the preservation policy measures, the 
coefficients βଶ and βଷ here can be interpreted as the extent to which this price elasticity is 
modified by a one standard deviation increase in the share of residential Listed Buildings and 
the share of dwellings within Conservation Areas, respectively. Our expectation is that all else 
equal historical preservation policies will make domestic energy consumption less elastic to 
exogenous national energy price changes (βଶ, βଷ ൐ 0).   
Although we account for national factors through year fixed effects and regional trends, the 
interaction terms in these regressions could be picking up local trends in energy consumption 
that are correlated with our time invariant measures of preservation policies. There are a 
variety of channels through which this could operate. For example, Koster et al. (2016) find 
that richer households in the Netherlands have strong preferences for historical amenities and 
tend to sort into historic neighbourhoods. Such individuals are likely to have a relatively price 
inelastic demand for energy and may also be more likely to own their homes rather than rent. 
Hence, they may have greater incentives to make long-term investments in improving home 
energy efficiency, as found empirically by Davis (2011). Aside from the characteristics of 
households, Kahn and Walsh (2015) identify climatic factors and housing stock 
characteristics as drivers of domestic energy consumption, while Glaeser and Kahn (2010) 
show that patterns of energy consumption can vary with urban form. 
To address these issues we progressively add a number of additional controls, fixed effects 
and trends to the specification in equation (2). We first include a set of variables in which 
linear time trends are interacted with a set of time-invariant demographic and socio-economic 
variables. These comprise MSOA median household income in 2004 as well as a number of 
variables drawn from the 2001 Census: share of residents with degree; share lone parents; 
share owner-occupiers; share ethnicity white; share age 45-59, share age 60+; share managers, 
professionals, or associate professionals; and share employed. The addition of these controls 
means we identify the impacts of preservation policies off of trends in energy consumption in 
places that are similar in terms of demographic and socio-economic characteristics, and 
should capture the heterogeneity in household energy demand elasticities documented by 
Reiss and White (2005). 
It is also possible that localised factors, such as temperature and weather, could be driving 
energy consumption patterns, so we next include a full set of Travel to Work Area (TTWA) 
by year fixed effects. This strategy allows us to partial out unobserved patterns in energy 
consumption common to labour market areas—for example those that might be driven by 
localised changes in climate—and, with around 140 TTWAs in England, imply that we are 
making comparisons across neighbourhoods in close proximity to one another (e.g. within 
London). 
The characteristics of the local housing stock are also likely to determine energy consumption 
and the scope for making energy efficiency improvements. To reflect this and to help us 
disentangle the effect of preservation policies from effects associated with the vintage of 
properties, we next introduce two further sets of trend variables, interacting linear trends with 
a vector of share variables for neighbourhood building types (share flat, share terrace, share 
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semi-detached with omitted category share detached), and a vector of neighbourhood building 
vintage variables (share built pre-1945, share built between 1945 and 1965, share built 
between 1964 and 1982, share built 1983-1999 with omitted category share built after 2000). 
The former set of trends reflects that different house types could imply different home energy 
needs or efficiency requirements. For example, detached houses will usually, all else equal, 
have more external wall area than other dwelling types.12 The latter set reflects well-
documented relationships in the literature: between building vintage and energy consumption 
(Costa and Kahn, 2010; Brounen et al., 2012; Kahn et al., 2014), and between building codes 
and energy consumption (Jacobsen and Kotchen, 2013, Aroonruengsawat et al., 2012). These 
building vintage controls are likely to be important in our setting where the housing stock 
comprises dwellings built using a range of building technologies and under various energy 
efficiency standards.13 In turn, localised variation in these features could be highly relevant in 
determining home energy consumption and the scope to improve home energy efficiency.   
Two further sets of controls account for patterns in domestic energy consumption that may be 
associated with urban structure and form. Urban economic theory suggests that urban density 
may be highest in the centre of cities, and—to the extent that denser places are more tightly 
regulated—it is possible our estimates may capture correlates of urban density rather than the 
effect of preservation regulation. To address this concern, and to control for other possible 
confounding factors, we next introduce the interaction between the distance between the 
MSOA centroid and the population weighted centre of the TTWA (S௜ሻ	with our energy price 
demand shifter as an additional control.  
The final control strategy reflects that households in rural and urban areas tend to rely on a 
different mix of fuels to provide home heating. Over two million dwellings in England, or 
about 10% of the total, are not connected to the gas transmission network (DECC, 2014). The 
vast majority of these dwellings are in rural places, and are heated by alternative fuels, 
including electrical heating, heating oil, and Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG). Thus, 
households living in such dwellings are more likely, than those residing in towns and cities, to 
consume a different mix of fuels and be exposed to a different set of fuel prices, neither of 
which we observe in our data. Off-gas-grid homes are also considered to be “hard-to-treat” in 
terms of improving home energy efficiency (Beaumont, 2007). In recognition of this issue, we 
drop most rural MSOAs, which we define as MSOAs that have zero mains gas consumption 
and those places recorded as being in a “sparse” or “village” setting in the 2011 Census, and 
allow for a linear trend in each of the remaining rural-urban categories. 
Taking account of these strategies, our final estimated specification is as follows: 
e௜௝௥௧ ൌ βଶp௧ି௠ ൈ List௜ ൅ βଷp௧ି௠ ൈ CA௜ ൅	λଵp௧ି௠ ൈ S௜ ൅ αଵw௝௧ ൅ γ௜	 ൅ ݃ሺݐሻ ൅	ε௜௝௥௧  (3) 
12 A related issue is that leaseholders will usually have to get permission from the freeholder to make certain 
energy efficiency upgrades. The share of leasehold dwellings is very highly correlated with the share of flats. 
13 In general, the older the house, the less likely it is that it was built with energy efficiency measures already 
installed. For example, houses built prior to the introduction of national Building Regulations in 1965 were 
rarely insulated, and there was no requirement to insulate houses until the 1980s. Houses built after the 1920s 
were generally built with cavity walls whereas those built previously had solid walls and as such cannot benefit 
from cavity wall insulation techniques. Thus, while older homes may have greater scope for energy efficiency 
improvements, such homes are typically “hard-to-treat” with energy efficiency upgrades (Beaumont, 2007; 
Dowson et al., 2012).   
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where our time effects g(t) are captured by TTWA-by-year fixed effects and linear time trends 
interacted with a host of geographical, housing market, and socio-economic variables (region 
indicators, Census 2001 variables, household income in 2004, building type and vintage share 
variables, and rural-urban indicators).  
After presenting results based on the specification described above, we report several sets of 
additional regressions in which we: (i) use an alternative estimation approach that exploits the 
richness of our data (stacked regression); (ii) explore the robustness of our main approach to 
changing the panel frequency or the lag structure of prices (i.e. where we vary the lag m); (iii) 
explore the robustness of our findings to using alternative dependent variables, trends, 
preservation policy measures, and demand shifters; and (iv) use Green Belts, another type of 
preservation policy, as a placebo test.  
The first set of these additional regressions exploits the depth of our data by treating each fuel 
type (indexed by f) separately, but stacking the observations so that each MSOA-year cell has 
two rows in the data. This permits us to adopt the following specification:  
e௙௜௝௥௧ ൌ βଶp௙ሺ௧ି௠ሻ ൈ List௜ ൅ βଷp௙ሺ௧ି௠ሻ ൈ	CA௜ ൅ ߜଵp௙ሺ௧ି௠ሻ ൈ S௜ ൅	αଵw௝௧ (4) 
൅γ௙௜ ൅ ݃ሺ݂, ݐሻ ൅	ε௙௜௝௥௧
Here, the natural log of domestic energy consumption per capita for fuel type f is regressed on 
the policy variables interacted with the one-year lag (m=1) of the log national real price for 
fuel type f, fuel-specific MSOA fixed effects (γ௙௜ሻ and where g(f,t) includes year by fuel type 
fixed effects, MSOA-year fixed effects, as well as the full set of trends from equation (3) 
interacted with fuel type f. One key benefit of this approach is that it allows us to control for 
MSOA-year fixed effects, which partial out any factors that have a common effect on per 
capita gas and electricity consumption in each MSOA-year cell. As such, this approach—in 
which we rely on divergences in electricity and gas prices for identification—provides a very 
powerful cross-check on our main specification, outlined in equation (3). 
Robustness checks (ii), (iii), and (iv) return to the model specified in equation (3). All checks 
use domestic energy consumption and price variables that combine the two fuel types (gas 
and electricity). Our placebo test with Green Belts is conducted using both the approach 
documented in equation (3) and the stacked regression in equation (4). 
3.3. Energy Price Elasticities 
Before exploring the effects of preservation policies on home energy-related outcomes, Table 
3 reports quantitative estimates of the elasticity of domestic energy consumption with respect 
to energy prices. We do not seek to make a causal interpretation of these estimates. Rather, 
the intention of this exercise is to provide benchmark elasticities against which we can 
interpret the effects of preservation policies estimated in subsequent tables. 
Table 3 documents several specifications that regress log per capita energy consumption on 
our weighted energy price measures and the control variables in equation (1), i.e. log heating 
degree days, log LPA wages, MSOA fixed effects, and linear region trends. In this and all 
subsequent tables, except where indicated, standard errors are clustered at LPA level. The first 
three columns of Table 3 report estimates of the elasticity of domestic energy consumption 
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with respect to different energy price lag structures. The specification in column (1) uses 
contemporaneous prices, column (2) uses a one-year lag, column (3) a two-year lag, and 
column (4) all these prices together. Although estimated elasticities are significant in all of the 
first three columns, the coefficients suggest that energy consumption responds most strongly 
to one-year lagged prices. The final column confirms this, and furthermore suggests the 
coefficient on the one-year lag (-0.479) is a good approximation for the aggregate effect 
across the all three price measures (which together sum to around -0.465). Based on these 
results, we use a one-year lag of prices as our demand shifter from this point forward, and 
adopt the coefficient from column (2) of Table 3 as a benchmark elasticity against which we 
interpret later results. The elasticity implies that for every 10% increase in the price of energy 
per unit, per capita domestic energy consumption falls by 4.8%. While relatively high, this is 
broadly comparable with estimates of short-term energy price elasticities from the literature.14     
3.4 Baseline Specifications – Domestic Energy Consumption 
Our analysis now turns to the extent to which preservation policies condition energy price 
elasticities. We first provide a visual illustration of the impact of preservation policies on 
energy price elasticities using MSOA-specific elasticities, which we obtain from estimating 
equation (1) but interacting the price variable with MSOA dummies. These estimated 
elasticities can be displayed visually using kernel density plots. To get a feel for the 
relationship between energy price elasticities and preservation policies we assign MSOAs to 
one of four quartiles based on the overall local extent of preservation policies, which we 
generate by adding up our main Conservation Area and Listed Buildings measures. The first 
and fourth quartiles, respectively, comprise the least and the most preserved MSOAs. Kernel 
density plots for MSOA-elasticities in each of these four groups are shown in Figure 7. 
Overall, these plots are consistent with the least preserved MSOAs having the most elastic 
response to energy prices and vice-versa. 
In subsequent regressions we introduce preservation policies by including interaction terms 
between the one-year lagged weighted energy price demand shifter and our measures of 
historical preservation policies. Each column of Table 4 refers to three separate regressions 
undertaken with the same specification but using different interaction terms: the regressions in 
Panel A always include the Listed Building interaction; Panel B the Conservation Area 
interaction; and, Panel C both preservation policy interactions. Moving from the left- to the 
right-hand side of the table we progressively add controls to deal with the endogeneity issues 
discussed in Section 3.2. 
Column (1) constitutes the analogue of equation (2), and includes MSOA and year fixed 
effects, regional trends, and LPA wages as controls. Looking at Panels A to C of column (1), 
it is evident that the interactions on Listed Buildings and Conservation Areas are significant 
when each is included in turn but when both are included jointly, only the Listed Building 
coefficient remains significant. We illustrate the broad magnitude of effects this specification 
implies by comparing the coefficients on the interaction terms to the elasticity given in 
14 For example, Ito (2014) finds an average price elasticity of electricity consumption of -0.12 while Reiss and 
White (2005) estimate an elasticity of -0.39. Our estimates are not directly comparable as we are estimating the 
elasticity of energy (gas + electricity) consumption with respect to weighted energy prices, but we obtain similar 
magnitudes when focusing on each fuel type separately.    
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column (2) of Table 3. For example, the coefficient in column (1) of Panel A of Table 4 
(0.0633) implies that a one standard deviation increase in the share of Listed Buildings 
reduces the energy price elasticity by 0.0633/0.479 = 13.2%.  
The remaining columns of Table 4 add further controls, building up to the model 
corresponding to equation (3). Columns (2) and (3) address the concern of correlated trends. 
In the first of these columns, we include a set of variables in which linear time trends are 
interacted with a set of demographic and socio-economic variables drawn from the 2001 
Census and median net household income in 2004. In Column (3) we replace the year fixed 
effects by year fixed effects interacted with a set of Travel to Work Area (TTWA) by year 
fixed effects. Across these two columns, the estimated effects for each of the preservation 
policies when considered individually are fairly stable. However, when compared to column 
(1) the specifications in Panel C suggest that the addition of control variables and trends 
allows us to better disentangle the effects of the two policies such that each is separately 
significant conditional on the other policy.  
In column (4), we attempt to condition out the effects that derive from the characteristics of 
the housing stock. As pointed out earlier, there may be more scope for energy efficiency 
upgrades in older houses independent of the impact of preservation policies. The findings in 
this specification demonstrate that when we compare like with like, the effects of preservation 
policies become stronger. This is consistent with our expectation that preservation policies 
apply to the dwellings with the most scope for improvement due to the age of these dwellings. 
In column (5), we condition out urban form issues by including the interaction between the 
distance from the MSOA to the TTWA centre and the one-year lagged energy price as an 
additional control. The preservation policy coefficients are remarkably stable.  
The final column (6) of Table 4 includes the full set of controls but also drops rural MSOAs 
and additionally allows for idiosyncratic linear trends for each of the other rural-urban 
indicator classifications. Our preferred specification is Panel C in column (6). This includes 
both preservation policies, the full set of controls, and controls for rural-urban issues. The 
coefficients are generally slightly weaker than those reported in the corresponding 
specification in column (5) yet remain highly significant.  
We estimate the broad magnitude of the impacts of the two preservation policies on the 
elasticity of domestic energy with respect to main energy prices, again using the estimate in 
column (2) of Table 3 as our benchmark elasticity. The comparison suggests that all else 
equal, a one standard deviation increase from the mean value in the number of Grade II Listed 
Buildings per 100 dwellings implies a reduction in the elasticity of 0.0211/0.479 = 4.4%. A 
one standard deviation increase from its mean value in the share of dwellings in Conservation 
Areas implies a reduction in the elasticity of 0.0169/0.479 = 3.5%. These comparisons 
represent conservative estimates of the effects of preservation policies because the benchmark 
price elasticity in the denominator is considerably more elastic than estimates found 
elsewhere in the literature.     
Despite the size of the coefficients and their implied quantitative magnitudes, these estimates 
do not imply that Conservation Areas have effects that are similar in magnitude to the more 
restrictive Listed Buildings, which would be counter-intuitive. This is because the standard 
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deviation of the number of Listed Buildings per 100 dwellings (2.7) is only around a fifth of 
the standard deviation of the share of all dwellings that are in Conservation Areas (15.7%). In 
fact, when we do not scale the data, our findings suggest that Listed Buildings reduce the 
price elasticity more than dwellings in Conservation Areas, by a factor of around seven. This 
is more consistent with our observation in Section 2 that, all else equal, a Listed Building is 
regulated by a considerably more restrictive regime than a dwelling in a Conservation Area.15 
3.5. Robustness Checks 
We first report findings from stacked regressions (equation (4)) in Table 5, which provide a 
powerful check on earlier findings. Reassuringly, results indicate that the policy interactions 
remain statistically significant when the policy variables are entered individually, or when 
entered together as in column (3). The relative size of the coefficients is broadly similar to 
those in column (6) of Table 4. However, there are some differences since in absolute terms 
the coefficients for the stacked regression reported in column (3) are around 20-30% larger 
than the results in our preferred (most rigorous) specification, suggesting that the latter 
estimates are likely to be conservative.16    
Our second set of robustness checks—reported in Table 6—considers the lag structure of 
energy prices and other timing issues. In the first four columns of Table 6, we report 
preservation effects using lag energy price assumptions other than the one-year lag used in 
our baseline specifications: column (1) uses contemporaneous energy prices; column (2) the 
second lag; column (3) uses both the current price as well as the first lag; and, finally column 
(4) uses the first and the second lag. Results suggest that the first lag of prices dominates and 
that our main findings using this lag structure should be sufficient to capture overall effects. A 
related issue is that until now, our estimates for domestic energy consumption have been 
generated from year-on-year variations at the MSOA-level that deviate from the trends 
implied by the initial characteristics of the Census. One concern may be that these changes are 
unlikely to be sufficient to induce households to adopt new technologies. To explore this 
possibility, column (5) evaluates the long-term adjustment to energy price changes by 
including only the first and last years (i.e. 2006 and 2013) of our panel and dropping all of the 
years in between. Results are largely consistent with our main results, albeit—as expected—
somewhat larger.  
To provide further checks on the validity of our findings we conduct a large number of further 
robustness checks. We describe and report two of these in Appendix A. In the first, we 
demonstrate that our findings are robust to using alternative dependent variables, trends, 
preservation policy measures, and demand shifters (Appendix Table 2). In the second, we re-
run the models specified in equations (3) and (4) with Green Belts included as an alternative 
15 To illustrate this, we calculate the effects corresponding to panel C of column (6) in Table 4, but without 
standardising variables. We find coefficients that imply that a 1% increase in the share of Listed Buildings 
reduces the energy price elasticity by around 1.5% and a 1% increase in the share of dwellings in Conservation 
Areas reduces the elasticity by 0.2%. Note that the maximum share of Listed Buildings in our sample is 27% so 
we are unable to make in-sample predictions above this limit. In general, we use the standardised versions since 
these allow us to simulate the effects of changing the intensity of preservation policies in plausible ways.  
16 One potential concern with the stacked regressions is that they are unweighted so that the estimation of the 
coefficients places equal weight on gas and electricity consumption. We obtained near identical results when 
weighting the regressions with the consumption share of each fuel type in each MSOA in 2005. 
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preservation policy but one that acts as a placebo.17 As expected, we find no significant 
results when Green Belt measures are interacted with the first lag of energy prices (Appendix 
Table 3).  
3.6 Mechanism: Home Energy Efficiency 
Our results so far imply that the prevalence of historical preservation policies reduces the 
energy price elasticity. The aim of this sub-section is to understand the underlying mechanism 
behind these effects. In particular, we evaluate whether the evidence is supportive of the 
proposition that the effects of preservation policies could be driven by a home energy 
efficiency channel. Some energy efficiency upgrades in designated dwellings may be either 
more expensive or fail to conform to regulations and hence, are technically illegal. 
To this end, in Table 7 we report similar regressions to those conducted in Table 4 but at the 
LPA level, replacing the dependent variable with counts of home energy efficiency 
installations and aggregating across all types of installations in our data. As noted in Section 
3.1, installations data are taken from the Home Energy Efficiency Database (HEED). Home 
energy efficiency installations recorded in this data include wall insulation, loft insulation, 
double glazing, new boilers, new heating systems, micro-generation and energy efficient 
lighting. Due to data availability, our set of controls is necessarily slightly different to the 
specifications reported in Table 4. Table 7 reports results conditional on LPA fixed effects, 
time-varying counts of LPA households, LPA wages, and additional demographic controls 
that are only available at the LPA level (share with first degree or equivalent, share aged 16-
44, and share aged 45+), as well as linear building type and vintage trends. Given our earlier 
considerations, we expect individuals living in designated dwellings to be less able to respond 
to higher energy prices, i.e. by investing in home energy efficiency, so that all else equal, the 
coefficients on the interaction between energy prices and the policy variables will be negative. 
This is borne out in the data. Column (1) of Table 7 suggests that a one standard deviation 
increase in the share of Listed Buildings and Conservation Area dwellings, respectively, 
reduces the amount of home energy investments significantly, by around 8,750 and 5,825 
installations. In the remainder of Table 7 we separate out specific installations to illustrate 
that, in line with our priors, Conservation Area restrictions tend to bite on external changes 
while those on Listed Buildings are more pervasive. For example, column (2) documents that 
both policies reduce wall insulations (which will sometimes be external) but in column (3) the 
effect of Conservation Areas on loft installations (which are internal) is insignificant. 
Columns (4) to (6) of Table 7 show results only for 2006 to 2007 due to the data being 
restricted to this period. The findings are quite similar: the coefficients for both policies are 
significant for double glazing (external) while effects on new heating systems and boilers 
(internal) are significant for Listed Buildings but not for Conservation Areas, consistent with 
our priors.18   
17 Green Belts surround many urban areas in England and are covered by strict rules that make it very difficult 
for developers to build new houses on them. However, unlike Conservation Areas and Listed Buildings, there is 
little reason to expect Green Belts to act as a constraint on investments in home energy efficiency improvements. 
18 While the results presented in Table 7 provide evidence in favour of the proposition that preservation policies 
decrease the elasticity of home energy efficiency technology adoption in response to energy price increases, 
these findings need to be interpreted with some caution due to data concerns (both because of the more 
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Finally, we quantitatively evaluate in Table 8 the impact of home energy efficiency 
investments on domestic energy consumption using dwelling-scale energy consumption and 
installations data drawn from the National Energy Efficiency Database (NEED). Controlling 
for dwelling fixed effects as well as time-varying area level characteristics, we find that the 
installation of new boilers, loft insulation, and wall insulation are associated with reductions 
in energy consumption of 7%, 2.5%, and 8%, respectively. Taken together these additional 
results are consistent with a technology adoption channel driving the relationship between 
preservation policies and domestic energy consumption found in Table 4. 
4. Counterfactual Analysis
To understand the implications of our findings, this sub-section presents the results from 
using our models to simulate energy consumption during our sample period under a range of 
alternative counterfactual scenarios. In all cases, the preferred model—column (6) of Panel C 
in Table 4—is used to make in-sample predictions. Because this specification drops rural 
MSOAs, we capture effects in urban areas only. Hence, we are likely to underestimate energy 
consumption for England as a whole.  
We first use the model to predict the total cumulative energy consumption between 2006 and 
2013, not considering any counterfactual changes. We do this by taking the fitted model 
values for log per capita domestic energy consumption for each MSOA, converting this into 
total domestic energy consumption and then summing up over the sample of MSOAs and 
years. As documented in Table 9, this gives a cumulative 2006 to 2013 total energy 
consumption of 2.4 million gigawatt hours (GwH). The remaining rows of Table 9 compare 
this baseline prediction with modelled predictions when we vary the share of all buildings that 
are affected by preservation policies. This allows us to assess the total impact of preservation 
policies on domestic energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions.  
The first set of scenarios in Panel A of Table 9—rows (1) to (3)—evaluates the amount of 
domestic energy savings that were not realised during our sample period due to historical 
preservation policies, by setting each preservation policy to zero in turn and comparing the 
outcome to our baseline prediction.19 We find that cumulative 2006 to 2013 domestic energy 
consumption (of all dwellings in the country, not just designated dwellings) would be reduced 
by: 1.7% if Conservation Areas are set to zero (row 1); 1.3% if Listed Buildings are set to 
zero (row 2); and, 3% if both preservation policies are set to zero (row 3).  
In the remaining columns of Table 9 we calculate the financial and carbon costs under DECC 
assumptions that: natural gas represents 73% of the domestic energy consumed; each kWh of 
electricity and natural gas consumed produces 0.185 kg and 0.523 kg of CO2, respectively; 
and, the unit costs of electricity and natural gas are 11.5p per kWh and 3p per kWh, 
respectively. Based on these assumptions, the two preservation policies collectively cost 
residents roughly £3.8 billion over the period 2006-13 and led to an additional 20.1 million 
tonnes of CO2 emitted. In the final column we demonstrate that, at 3%, the saving is a 
aggregated nature of the analysis and because of the lesser quality of the underlying data compared to the data 
utilised in our first panel). 
19 This essentially assumes the preservation polices are removed instantly at the start of 2006. As noted above, 
this is not meant as a realistic scenario but rather to provide some scale to the overall quantitative effects. 
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relatively small proportion of total energy consumption. However, only around 10% of 
England’s dwellings are affected by preservation policies. This implies that absent 
preservation policy restrictions, energy consumption in these particular dwellings would have 
been reduced by more than a quarter.  
Panels B to D of Table 9 describe three further counterfactual scenarios. In Panel B, the 
preservation policies are reverted back to 1980 levels, a scenario that we deem plausible in 
that most buildings with high heritage value were already designated at that point in time.20 
During the 1980s, there was a major spike in the number of Listed Buildings (see Figure 4) 
due to a review of the Statutory List that accelerated following public outcry at the demolition 
of London's (unlisted) Art Deco Firestone tyre factory, in 1980. In essence, our counterfactual 
reflects what may have occurred had the list review not taken place and had the numbers of 
designated dwellings remained at 1980 levels ever since. Reducing both policies back to 1980 
levels has the effect of reducing Conservation Areas by around a third and the number of 
Listed Buildings by around half. Under these assumptions 2006-2013 energy consumption is 
reduced by 1.3% or around 31,500 GWh. This implies a cumulative saving to households of 
roughly £1.7 billion and 8.9 million tonnes less carbon. In Panels C and D, we explore the 
effects of reducing or increasing, respectively, preservation policies by one standard 
deviation.  
5. Welfare considerations
In this section we discuss the wider welfare implications of our empirical findings. Any 
assessment of such welfare effects would first need to consider at least five types of benefits 
related to heritage and designation. First, there is an internal heritage effect,	ܾூு, a value 
attached to historic buildings irrespective of designation. Second, there are external localised 
heritage effects,	ܾாு, a value attached to houses nearby with views of historic buildings. 
Third, there may be wider external benefits such as the existence value of historic buildings 
(see Wright and Eppink, 2016),	ܾா௏, which again may apply irrespective of designation. 
Fourth, there is a value for designated historic buildings, ܾ஽ு. If designation does not generate 
additional benefits, then ܾ஽ு ൌ ܾூு. Or put differently, ܾூ஽௉ ൌ ܾ஽ு െ ܾூு is the internal 
premium in value attached to designation. Fifth, there is a value attached to houses with views 
of designated buildings, ܾ௏஽. If designation has an inherent value for nearby owners, ܾ௏஽ ൐
ܾாு, or we can denote the external heritage designation premium as	ܾா஽௉ ൌ ܾ௏஽ െ ܾாு.  
Maintaining heritage value and complying with preservation policy-induced legal restrictions 
not only generates benefits but also incurs costs, some of which may be neglected  by policy 
makers when making decisions about whether to designate buildings or entire areas for 
preservation. We consider several types of costs associated with heritage and designation. 
First, there are two types of internal costs associated with heritage. Some of these internal 
20 This is supported by the finding of Ahlfeldt et al. (2012) that property price premiums for Conservation Area 
dwellings increase with the time since designation and that those designated before 1981 trade at a slight 
premium to those designated thereafter. The idea that time since designation is positively related to heritage 
value also finds support from some bloggers e.g. the NLP Planning Blog in Feb 2012: “…additions to 
conservation areas beyond the original designations are often substantial in size, and also because in my 
experience extended areas are: 1) not always closely related to the character of the original designation; and, 2) 
often of lesser quality in historic and townscape value terms than the original core designated areas. This often 
raises serious questions as to why these additional areas were designated.”  
19
costs, ܿூா, are associated with higher energy consumption, whereas others, ܿூை, are not (e.g., 
higher maintenance costs and increased costs associated with ‘outdated’ layouts). Similarly, 
designated heritage buildings have internal costs, ܿ஽ா and ܿ஽ை, where ܿ஽ை includes the 
increased costs associated with obtaining planning permission or the outright inability to 
redevelop at higher density. The internal cost of designation associated with energy, ܿூ஽ா, is 
thus ܿ஽ா െ ܿூா, which arises because designation increases the cost of energy efficiency 
improvements or prevents them altogether. The other internal policy costs associated with 
designation, ܿூ஽ை, are equal to ܿ஽ை െ ܿூை. Second, there is an external policy cost, cா஽, in the 
form of increased GHG emissions (and possibly other negative externalities associated with 
designation-induced restrictions). Third, there is likely to be a designation induced cost in the 
form of a general equilibrium effect ܿீா, due to preservation policies creating aggregate 
constraints on housing supply at city- or country-level (Glaeser, 2011; Hilber and Vermeulen, 
2016). While we cannot estimate the potential costs of such constraints, these are likely to 
push up house prices and thus reduce housing consumption in England significantly.21  
Recent research has focused mainly on the benefits of historic preservation, with empirical 
work largely based on house price data. Based on house sales in the Netherlands, Koster et al. 
(2016) estimate the premium for houses with views of designated buildings, i.e., ܾܸܦ, at 
around 3.5%, and additionally provide results (in an Appendix) which suggest, when 
controlling for external effects, designated buildings do not trade at a premium, i.e., ܾܦܪ െ
ܿ஽ா െ ܿ஽ை =0. Ahlfeldt et al. (2012) estimate that houses just inside and outside Conservation 
Areas in England trade at a positive premium of 8.5%  (= ܾ஽ு ൅ ܾ௏஽ െ ܿ஽ா െ ܿ஽ை) and 5% 
(=ܾ௏஽), respectively, relative to other houses and conditional on controls.22 They also explore 
the impact of designation on property prices, finding it has a weak positive effect on places 
just outside of Conservation Areas (i.e., ܾா஽௉ ൌ ܾ௏஽ െ ܾாு > 0). For New York, Been et al. 
(2016) find that the act of designating historic districts offers a substantive boost to the value 
of properties immediately outside the district, of nearly 12%, which is significantly larger 
than the estimate of ܾா஽௉ in Ahlfeldt et al. (2012). However, these same properties sell at a 
discount (of roughly 5%) prior to the designation, suggesting unobserved differences in 
structural features of properties in the vicinity of newly designated historic districts or lower 
levels of investment in those properties.23  
On the cost side, Been et al. (2016) document that in areas where the value of the option to 
build unrestricted is higher, designation has a less positive effect on property values within 
the district. This suggests larger other internal costs, ܿ஽ை. In a similar vein, Ahlfeldt et al. 
(2012) find a zero effect of designation on house prices inside Conservation Areas (i.e. 
ܾா஽௉ ൅ ܾூ஽௉ െ ܿூ஽ா െ ܿூ஽ை = 0). Interpreting this evidence leads Ahlfeldt et al. (forthcoming) 
to conclude the private benefits (arising from preservation) and costs associated with 
designation (e.g. in the form of higher maintenance costs or lower energy efficiency) may 
21 This is also consistent with Waights (2016) who finds that locations with more Conservation Areas have 
higher house prices for given land values and building costs (indicating lower housing productivity) and higher 
house prices for given wages (indicating higher ‘quality of life’). 
22 Also see Holman and Ahlfeldt (2015), Ahlfeldt et al. (forthcoming), and Ahlfeldt and Holman (forthcoming). 
23 Although not focused on the impact of designation per se, Koster and Rouwendal (forthcoming) use temporal 
variation in investments in cultural heritage to identify the impact of such investments on prices of houses not 
covered by designation, in the Netherlands. 
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perfectly offset each other, which is suggestive of localised Pareto efficiency. However, 
similar to Koster et al. (2016) they neither separately estimate the internal policy costs of 
designation associated with energy consumption, ܿூ஽ா, nor attempt to quantify the external 
policy cost,  ܿா஽, both of which are the focus of our analysis. 
We infer from our first counterfactual scenario (Panel A of Table 9) that ܿூ஽ா approximates 
£3.8 billion in additional energy bills over the period from 2006 to 2013, almost £0.5 billion 
annually (or in perpetuity, £15.9 billion assuming a discount rate of 3%).24 This is equivalent 
to a £240 increase in annual energy bills for each of the two million dwellings covered by 
preservation policies in England. We can express these additional energy bills as an 
approximate proportion of house prices. To the extent that higher energy bills are fully 
capitalised into lower house prices (at a discount rate of 3%), an average house price in 
Conservation Areas of around £240,000 implies a price effect of -3.3%. Reassuringly, this 
implied private cost is quite close to the hedonic value of energy efficiency certification 
(‘green labels’) in the literature of 5% in California (Kahn and Kok, 2014) and 3.5% in the 
Netherlands (Brounen and Kok, 2011).25  
To quantify the external policy cost associated with designation, ܿா஽, we use an estimated 
marginal abatement cost of GHG emissions of £61 (non-traded, ‘central range’ price for 2013, 
at the end of our study period, in 2015 prices, following DECC, 2015). This implies a social 
carbon cost of preservation policies of around £1.23 billion over the period 2006-2013, 
around £153.3 million annually (or in perpetuity, £5.11 billion). These totals are, respectively, 
equivalent to an annual social cost of £76.7 (or in perpetuity £2,554) per designated dwelling. 
Although these costs will not be capitalised into house prices, we note that they equate to 
1.1% of the average value of a house in Conservation Areas. If we only consider a relaxation 
of preservation policies to 1980-levels, rather than the unrealistic scenario of abolishing these 
policies entirely, the carbon cost savings between 2006 and 2013 amount to £540 million—or 
around £2.3 billion in present value terms.  
If we take the finding in Ahlfeldt et al. (forthcoming) at face value that designation has a zero 
net internal effect (i.e., within designated areas) on house prices at the margin, then  ܾா஽௉ ൅
ܾூ஽௉ ൌ ܿூ஽ா ൅ ܿூ஽ை. This is consistent with political economy frameworks that model 
preservation as the outcome of localised decision making. There are, however, at least two 
types of external benefits that are likely ignored by local residents: an existence value, ܾா௏, 
and an external designation premium, ܾா஽௉, safeguarded by historic preservation. The recent 
economic literature has mainly focused on these benefits. The literature also recognises 
external costs associated with general equilibrium effects, ܿீா, due to regulatory supply 
constraints (including those imposed by preservation policies) creating aggregate constraints 
24 For ease of interpretation, we apply a discount rate of 3% throughout this section. Her Majesty’s Treasury’s 
Green Book, which informs cost-benefit analysis of UK government policy, suggests a discount rate of 3.5% for 
the first 30 years and declining discount rates thereafter (3% for years 31-75, 2.5% for years 76-125, 2% for 
years 126-200, 1.5% for years 201-300 and 1% for years 301+). Our discount rate in perpetuity of 3% is a 
simplified approximation of this schedule but with the advantage of making our calculations easily accessible. 
Also note that in estimating the social cost of carbon we assume a constant carbon price over time when carbon 
price schedules published by the UK’s government typically assume a rising prices in the future. 
25 The hedonic value of energy efficiency certificates can be interpreted as the present value of energy savings 
resulting from up-to-date home energy efficiency installations (compared to ‘standard’ or outdated ones). 
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on housing supply. In this paper we identify and emphasize for the first time yet another 
sizeable external cost: the external policy (or carbon) cost ܿா஽. These external costs are also 
likely ignored by local residents in determining the extent of preservation.  
6. Conclusions
Policies to preserve the built environment are increasingly widespread across North America 
and Europe and are particularly prevalent in the UK. External benefits of these policies are 
well documented. At the same time, governments around the world have set ambitious energy 
saving and GHG emissions reductions targets. In this context, the UK government’s Home 
Energy Efficiency Policy Framework (Committee on Climate Change, 2014) recognizes that 
“…beyond 2017 low-cost potential [loft, cavity wall] is increasingly exhausted”. This has led 
to a shift in focus towards different energy-saving technologies and a focus on 9.2 million 
“hard-to-treat” homes, which includes many buildings in Conservation Areas as well as 
Listed Buildings.  
In this paper we uncover a trade-off between improvements in energy efficiency and 
preserving built heritage. We present evidence that restrictions on alterations to dwellings that 
are either lying in Conservation Areas or are designated as Listed Buildings substantially 
increased domestic energy consumption in England between 2006 and 2013. We find that 
rising energy prices induce an increase in home energy efficiency installations and a 
corresponding decrease in energy consumption. However such energy savings are 
significantly less pronounced in Conservation Areas and Listed Buildings. Our findings imply 
that policies that aim to induce energy savings and reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the 
UK’s housing stock ought to account for the unintended consequences of regulations induced 
by preservation policies.  
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TABLES 
Table 1 
Preservation Policies and Home Energy Efficiency Improvements 
Not Listed or CA Conservation Areas Listed Buildings 
Planning Building 
Regulations
Planning Building 
Regulations 
Planning Building 
Regulations 
Replacement boiler/heating ? 
New boiler/heating  AS  AS ? AS 
New doors and windows Flats*  AS Flats*/Art4  AS √ AS
Loft insulation ? ? 
External wall insulation √**  √  √ √  √ √  
Cavity wall insulation AS***  AS*** √  AS***
Wind turbine  Flats AS  Art4 AS  √ AS
Solar panels  AS  Art4 AS  √ AS
Ground & Air source heat pumps AS ? Add √ Add
Notes: AS = Can use a tradesman registered under an Approved Scheme to avoid an application; Add= Additional conditions 
must be met; ? = Property owner should consult with Local Planning Authority; Art4 =  Conservation areas under Article 4 
directions may require an application; Flats = Application needed for flats but not houses. 
* Depending on the nature of the work, planning permission is needed, when not exactly a like-for-like replacement.
** Since January 2013 external wall insulation on individual dwellings (houses) has been classed as an alteration for the 
purposes of “permitted development”, meaning planning permission may not be required.  
*** No self-certification scheme until 2010, i.e. until then there had to be a building notice from the householder. 
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Table 2a 
Summary Statistics: MSOA Main Regression Sample 
Obs.
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
Min. Max. overall between within
Panel data 
Log per capita domestic energy consumption (kWh) 44,149 8.92 0.23 0.21 0.09 7.58 9.61
Log real one year lag weighted energy price per kWh 44,149 1.79 0.20 0.13 0.15 1.22 2.73
Cross-sectional data 
Planning Variables 
Grade II Listed buildings per 100 dwellings 5,665 1.41 2.68  0 27.00
Share of dwellings in Conservation Area in % 5,665 9.33 15.69  0 100
Census 2001 Variables 
Share degree educated in % 5,665 14.77 8.52 2.08 54.10
Share lone parent in % 5,665 2.68 1.38 0.35 9.75
Share owner-occupier in % 5,665 68.88 16.90 8.11 98.06
Share ethnicity white in % 5,665 90.67 14.72  11.03 100
Share aged 45-59 in % 5,665 18.80 3.58 4.47 29.61
Share aged 60 or above in % 5,665 20.61 5.73 3.46 55.61
Share Manager, Professional, Assoc. Professional  in % 5,665 39.80 12.48 13.07 82.21
Share employed in % 5,665 45.88 6.61 17.25 67.32
Dwelling characteristics 
Share dwellings built before 1945 in % 5,665 38.57 23.50 0 99.51
Share dwellings built 1945-1964 in % 5,665 18.37 14.74 0 96.77
Share dwellings built 1965-1982 in % 5,665 20.47 14.71 0 99.64
Share dwellings built 1983-1999 in % 5,665 13171 11.02 0 99.16
Share dwellings built since 2000 in % 5,665 9.42 7.97 0 70.22
Share flats in % 5,665 22.18 21.62 0 99.81
Share terraced in % 5,665 27.53 17.16 0 94.66
Share detached in % 5,665 25.70 21.13 0 85.23
Share semi-detached in % 5,665 24.59 14.39  0 85.49
Other 
Distance to TTWA centre  (km) 5,665 0.11 0.08 0.001 0.62
MSOA median household income in 2004 (£) 5,665 495.34 116.79 240 1120
Notes: Planning variables reported in this Table are not standardised as in the regressions. 
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Table 2b 
Summary Statistics: LPA Regression Sample 
Obs.
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
Min. Max. overall between within
Panel data 
Total home energy efficiency installations 1,510 24,714 22,963 20,444 10,510 2,895 298,444
Wall insulation 1,510 4,071 4,198 3,636 2,107 25 51,444
New loft insulation  1,510 1,226 1,508 1,162 964 7 23,042
Double glazing 604 5,447 4,447 4,215 1,427 619 55,096
Heating systems 604 1,051 1,130 1,085 316 93 13,445
New boiler 604 896 1,052 970 408 84 14,245
Log real lagged weighted energy price per kWh 1,510 1.73 0.18 0.10 0.15 1.36 2.26
Share age 16-45 in % 1,510 0.39 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.27 0.60
Share age 45+ in % 1,510 0.43 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.20 0.59
Share with degree in % 1,510 0.20 0.09 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.57
Log real male FT wage 1,510 6.37 0.16 0.15 0.04 5.99 7.21
Log heating degree days 1,510 1.74 0.10 0 0.10 1.63 1.92
Log household count 1,510 10.61 0.55 0.55 0.04 8.73 12.72
Cross-sectional data 
Planning Variables 
Grade II Listed buildings per 100 dwellings 302 1.90 2.10  0.06 11.90
Share of dwellings in Conservation Area in % 302 10.03 9.18  0.23 65.10
Notes: Planning variables reported in this Table are not standardised as in the regressions. 
Table 3 
Energy Price Elasticities: OLS 
Dependent Variable: Log domestic energy 
consumption per person 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log contemporaneous weighted energy price -0.0865*** 0.00918 
(0.00777)  (0.00860) 
Log one year lagged weighted energy price -0.479*** -0.397*** 
(0.00854) (0.00925)
Log two year lagged weighted energy price -0.187*** -0.0680*** 
(0.00458) (0.00457) 
Log heating degree days 0.0508*** 0.222*** 0.0789*** 0.203*** 
(0.00239) (0.00328) (0.00236) (0.00339) 
Log LPA male FT real median wage -0.0582*** -0.0210 -0.0393** -0.0193 
(0.0188) (0.0161) (0.0165) (0.0163) 
MSOA fixed effects √ √ √ √ 
Linear time trend x Region √ √ √ √ 
Observations 38,512 38,512 38,512 38,512 
Adj. R-squared 0.976 0.980 0.978 0.980 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at LPA level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4 
Baseline Specifications: OLS, Domestic Energy Consumption 
Dep Var: Log domestic energy consumption per person  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
PANEL A: Listed Buildings  
Log one year lagged energy price  0.0633*** 0.0336*** 0.0305*** 0.0315*** 0.0324*** 0.0320*** 
ൈ Grade II Listed per 100 dwellings (0.00340) (0.00287) (0.00274) (0.00293) (0.00295) (0.00415) 
Adj. R-squared 0.982 0.986 0.987 0.988 0.988 0.985
PANEL B: Conservation Areas 
Log one year lagged energy price  0.0329*** 0.0220*** 0.0175*** 0.0225*** 0.0224*** 0.0222*** 
ൈ Share dwellings in Conservation Area (0.00621) (0.00355) (0.00363) (0.00328) (0.00332) (0.00346) 
Adj. R-squared 0.981 0.986 0.987 0.988 0.988 0.985
PANEL C: Historical Preservation Policies 
Log one year lagged energy price  0.0580*** 0.0292*** 0.0269*** 0.0259*** 0.0267*** 0.0211*** 
ൈ Grade II Listed per 100 dwellings (0.00379) (0.00342) (0.00326) (0.00313) (0.00305) (0.00422) 
Log one year lagged energy price  0.0109 0.0129*** 0.0105** 0.0153*** 0.0152*** 0.0169***
ൈ Share dwellings in Conservation Area (0.00765) (0.00435) (0.00418) (0.00352) (0.00346) (0.00370) 
Adj. R-squared 0.982 0.986 0.987 0.988 0.988 0.985
Controls, Fixed Effects and Trends 
Log LPA wages √ √ √ √ √ √ 
MSOA fixed effects √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Linear time trend x Region √ √ √ √ √ √
Year fixed effects √ √
2001 Census and 2004 income linear trends √ √ √ √ √ 
TTWA-by-year √ √ √ √ 
Building age & type linear trends √ √
Distance to TTWA centre x energy price √ √ 
Drop rural MSOAs & rural-urban linear trends  √ 
Observations 44,149 44,149 44,149 44,149 44,149 40,410
Notes: Standard errors clustered at LPA level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All policy variables are standardised. Energy price variable is a weighted
average of real national gas and electricity prices, lagged one period. 2001 Census trends are linear time trends interacted with net household income in 2004; 2001 share 
with degree; share lone parents; share owner-occupiers; share ethnicity white; share ages 45-59, share aged 60+; share managers, professionals, or associate 
professionals; share employed. Building age categories are share built before 1945, share built 1945-1964, share built 1965-1982, share built 1983-1999 (omitted share 
built since 2000). Building type categories are share semi-detached, share flats and share terraced (omitted share detached).
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Table 5 
Robustness Check: Alternative Estimation Approach (Stacking Regression) 
Dep Var: Log domestic energy consumption per person (1) (2) (3) 
Log one year lagged energy price 0.0369*** 0.0247* 
ൈ Grade II Listed per 100 dwellings (0.0121) (0.0135) 
Log one year lagged energy price  0.0274*** 0.0206** 
ൈ Share dwellings in Conservation Area  (0.00808) (0.00897) 
Controls, Fixed Effects and Trends 
MSOA-by fuel type fixed effects √ √ √
Region-by fuel type linear trends √ √ √ 
MSOA-by-year √ √ √
Fuel type-by-year √ √ √
2001 Census and 2004 income linear trends x fuel type √ √ √
Building age & type linear trends x fuel type √ √ √
Distance to TTWA centre x energy price √ √ √
Drop rural MSOAs & rural-urban linear trends x fuel type √ √ √
Observations 80,836 80,836 80,836 
Adj. R-squared 0.996 0.996 0.996 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at LPA level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All 
policy variables are standardised. Energy prices are lagged by one year.  
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Table 6 
Robustness Check: Panel Frequency and Lagged Energy Prices 
Dep Var: Log domestic energy 
consumption per person 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Current prices Second lag Current & first lag First & second lag 2006 & 2013 
Log weighted energy price 
 x Grade II Listed per 100 dwellings  0.0254*** 0.00712 0.0274***
 (0.00547) (0.00608) (0.00560)
 x Share dwellings in Conservation Area  0.0206*** 0.00549 0.0184***
 (0.00417) (0.00718) (0.00471)
Lag 1: Log energy price 
 x Grade II Listed per 100 dwellings 0.0207*** 0.0142*** 
(0.00484) (0.00506)
 x Share dwellings in Conservation Area 0.0132* 0.0112*** 
(0.00686) (0.00398)
Lag 2: Log energy price 
 x Grade II Listed per 100 dwellings 0.0170*** 0.00761** 
(0.00416) (0.00361)
 x Share dwellings in Conservation Area 0.0162*** 0.00909**
(0.00382) (0.00416)
Controls, Fixed Effects and Trends 
Log LPA wages √ √ √ √ √ 
MSOA fixed effects √ √ √ √ √ 
Linear time trend x Region √ √ √ √ √ 
Year fixed effects √ √ √ √ √ 
2001 Census and 2004 income linear trends √ √ √ √ √ 
TTWA-by-year √ √ √ √ √ 
Building age & type linear trends √ √ √ √ √ 
Distance to TTWA centre x energy price  √ √ √ √ √ 
Drop rural MSOAs & rural-urban linear trends √ √ √ √ √ 
Observations 40,410 35,259 40,410 35,259 9,764
Adj. R-squared  0.985 0.986 0.985 0.986 0.978
Notes: Standard errors clustered at LPA level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All policy variables are standardised. Energy prices lagged as indicated.
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Table 7 
Mechanism: Energy Prices and Energy Efficiency Installations 
Panel timespan: 2006-2010 2006-2007 
Dependent variable: All installations Wall insulation Loft insulation Double 
glazing 
Heating New boiler
Nature of upgrade: Internal/External Internal/External Internal External Internal Internal 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log one year lagged energy price  -8,745*** -1,388*** -693*** -1,600*** -865*** -917*** 
ൈ Grade II Listed per 100 dwellings (2,372) (495) (226) (603) (163) (216)
Log one year lagged energy price  -5,828** -1,018* -330 -2,127*** 120 -330 
 ൈ Share dwellings in Conservation Area (2,667) (568) (258) (782) (191) (287)
Log household count 2,606 627 302 1,465 548 176 
(4,125) (866) (433) (1,386) (376) (403)
Controls, Fixed Effects and Trends 
LPA fixed effects √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Year fixed effects √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Building age and type linear trends √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Demographic controls and wages √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Observations 1,510 1,510 1,510 604 604 604
Adj. R-squared 0.916 0.873 0.810 0.938 0.934 0.855
Notes: Standard errors clustered at LPA level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample includes 304 LPAs with Conservation Area data. 
Installations data from the HEED database. Wall insulations include cavity wall and external wall insulation. Loft insulations capture new installations but 
exclude upgrades to existing insulation. All installations include a wide variety of energy efficiency installations e.g. wall insulation, loft insulations, new boiler, 
and heating, microgeneration and energy efficient lighting. Energy price variable is a weighted average of real national gas and electricity prices, lagged one 
period. Demographic controls include time varying demographic controls: share with degree, share age 16-45, share age 45+ and log FT male real average wage. 
Columns (4)-(6) based on 2006-2007 as data for these installations only held for this period. 
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Table 8 
Mechanism: Energy Efficiency & Consumption 
Dep Var: Log domestic energy 
consumption per person 
(1) (2)
New boiler -0.0711*** -0.0703*** 
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Loft insulation -0.0247*** -0.0244*** 
(0.0006) (0.0006)
Wall insulation -0.0771*** -0.0793*** 
(0.0007) (0.0007)
Dwelling fixed effects √ √ 
Fuel poverty decile-by-year FE √ 
Deprivation decile-by-year FE √ 
Observations 27,803,027 27,803,027
Adj. R-squared 0.703 0.703 
Notes: *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.Based on NEED database 2005-
2012. Estimates based on all English dwelling types and sizes. 
Table 9 
Counterfactual Scenarios 
Total Gas + Electricity (GwH) Predicted GwH 
2006 -2013 
cumulative
Difference 
GwH 
Difference 
£ million 
Difference  
CO2  
(MtCO2e) 
Difference 
% 
Baseline Prediction 2,440,836 
Panel A: Remove All Preservation Policies 
(1) Conservation Areas 2,398,140 -42,696 -2,261 -11.8 -1.7% 
(2) Listed Buildings 2,409,555 -31,281 -1,656 -8.6 -1.3% 
(3) Both Preservation Policies 2,368,214 -72,622 -3,845 -20.1 -3.0% 
Panel B: Reduce to 1980 Levels 
(4) Conservation Areas 2,424,985 -15,851 -839 -4.4 -0.6% 
(5) Listed Buildings 2,424,259 -16,577 -878 -4.6 -0.7% 
(6) Both Preservation Policies 2,408,568 -32,268 -1,709 -8.9 -1.3% 
Panel C: Reduce by 1 Standard Deviation 
(7) Conservation Areas 2,415,625 -25,211 -1,335 -7.0 -1.0% 
(8) Listed Buildings 2,417,741 -23,095 -1,223 -6.4 -0.9% 
(9) Both Preservation Policies 2,392,999 -47,837 -2,533 -13.2 -2.0% 
Panel D: Increase by 1 Standard Deviation 
(10) Conservation Areas 2,516,541 75,705 4,009 20.9 3.1% 
(11) Listed Buildings 2,536,179 95,343 5,048 26.3 3.9% 
(12) Both Preservation Policies 2,614,859 174,023 9,215 48.1 7.1% 
Notes: Table uses conversion factors for 2010 Electricity kWh = 0.523 kg CO2 and Natural gas kWh = 0.185 kg CO2 (Source: 
DECC’s “Tool for calculation of CO2 emissions from organisations”). Calculations assume natural gas is 73% of total
domestic (gas + electricity) based on the average total consumption in the sample MSOAs in the sample timeframe. The
average unit prices for electricity and gas are taken from DECC publications for 2007 paying on credit, 11.5 pence per kWh
electricity and 3 pence per kWh domestic gas. 
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FIGURES 
Fig. 1  
Conservation Areas in England 
Source: English Heritage. Data missing for 50 LPAs (blue) 
Fig. 2  
Conservation Areas by Year of Designation 
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Fig. 3  
Listed Buildings in England 
Source: English Heritage 
Fig. 4 
Listed Buildings by Year of Listing 
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Fig. 5 
Impact of Strict Preservation Policy on Investments in Home Energy  
Efficiency Investments and Energy Consumption 
Fig. 6 
UK Energy Price and Production Indices 2000- 2014 
  Source: DECC 
0
1
2
3
2000 2005 2010 2015
year
UK unit electricity price index UK unit gas price index
North Sea gas production index
36
Fig. 7 
MSOA Energy Price Elasticity Kernel Density, by Extent of Preservation 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Robustness Checks 
In this appendix, we document supplementary robustness checks we undertake in order to 
confirm the validity of our findings. Descriptive statistics for all variables used in these 
regressions are found in Appendix Table 1 while details about the underlying data are 
contained in Appendix B. 
The first additional set of robustness checks in Appendix Table 2 reports regressions that vary 
individual elements of our preferred specification in column (6) of Panel C in Table 4. This 
specification drops a small number of cells that experience large (>25%) year-on-year 
changes in energy consumption. In the first two columns, we demonstrate that our overall 
findings are robust to alternative restrictions, either where we do not drop any MSOA-year 
cells (column (1)), or drop MSOA-year cells that experience very large changes (>50%). In 
the remaining columns of Appendix Table 2, we demonstrate that our main findings are 
robust to varying our control trends, planning constraints measures, and shifters of the 
demand for energy efficiency installations. One potential concern with our preferred 
specification is that our trends may not adequately control for correlated variation. To 
mitigate this, we show that our findings are largely insensitive to alternative trend 
specifications, by replacing 2001 Census trends in column (3) with 2011 Census trends and 
with trend variables interacted with the change in the share variables occurring between the 
two Censuses, in column (4).  
Columns (5)-(7) demonstrate that findings are also robust with respect to alternative 
specifications of the planning variables. In column (5), we drop all MSOAs that include a 
Conservation Area designated after 1 January 2005 and do not count any Listed Buildings 
designated since this date. In column (6), we re-specify the Conservation Area measure as the 
share of developed (urban and suburban) land in a Conservation Area using land cover data 
from a 1991 survey. In column (7), we re-specify the Listed Building measure by counting all 
Listed Buildings rather than Grade II ones only. The final two columns focus on alternative 
demand shifter specifications. In column (8), we instrument log weighted energy prices using 
log North Sea gas production. In column (9), we weight energy prices using national 
proportions of each type of energy consumed (meaning the demand shifter is common to all 
MSOAs). All told, the results in this table suggest robustness to a variety of changes in 
specification and underlying data content. 
In a second robustness check we conduct a test using a third type of preservation policy: 
Green Belts. Green Belts surround many urban areas in England and are covered by strict 
rules that make it very difficult for developers to build new houses inside areas under this 
planning designation. However, unlike Conservation Areas and Listed Buildings, there is little 
reason to expect Green Belts to act as a constraint on investments in home energy efficiency 
improvements. Thus, we consider regressions using Green Belts as a placebo test of our main 
results. In the first column of Appendix Table 3 we replicate the specifications from Table 4 
column (6) but, as our preservation policy measure, use the number of dwellings in the Green 
Belt in each LPA. In the second column, we then include all three preservation policies 
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jointly. The coefficients on Green Belt interactions are insignificant while the coefficients on 
the Conservation Area and Listed Building interactions are largely unaffected by the inclusion 
of Green Belts. Columns (3) and (4) show that we reach similar conclusions when we repeat 
this exercise using the stacked regression approach.  
Appendix B: Detailed Description of Data and Sources 
This appendix provides details on the various sources and computation of variables used in 
our empirical analysis. 
The analysis rests on a dataset of neighbourhood level domestic energy consumption, 
historical preservation policies, and control variables at the Middle Layer Super Output Area 
(MSOA) spatial scale. MSOAs are small area statistical geographies introduced following the 
2001 Census. The 6,781 MSOAs in England with which we perform our analysis were 
designed to be relatively homogeneous in terms of their populations and contain between 
2,000 and 6,000 households. Data for domestic energy consumption are publically available 
through the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) sub-national consumption 
statistics. The dataset records the total amount of domestic mains gas distributed through the 
National Transmission System and electricity consumed in each MSOA in each year in 
kilowatt hours (kWh) between 2006 and 2013.26 Population data from the Office of National 
Statistic (ONS) (mid-year Population Estimates for Lower Layer Super Output Areas in 
England and Wales by Single Year of Age and Sex) are then matched into the data. A small 
number of MSOAs that miss data for energy consumption or population are dropped. Our 
main domestic energy measure is generated by taking the natural log of energy consumption, 
summed across these two energy types, divided by population.27 
We also provide a panel analysis of home energy efficiency installations at the Local Planning 
Authority (LPA)-level. This second panel is constructed using data on home energy efficiency 
installations from the Home Energy Efficiency Database (HEED) held by the Energy Saving 
Trust. Home energy efficiency installations are not available to us at the MSOA-level, so by 
necessity the spatial units in this panel are the 354 pre-2009 LPAs in England. The panel runs 
only from 2005 to 2010 after which LPAs were reorganised. We use the HEED data that 
records the total number of annual installations, exploiting the richness of installation types, 
including wall insulations, loft insulations, double glazing, new boilers, new heating systems, 
micro-generation and energy efficient lighting. We treat these installations as a stock (because 
the upgrades we focus on are durable) and specify dependent variables based on installations 
in levels. Control variables in this panel include household counts, share with degree 
education, and FT male median wages from NOMIS, and population age groups based on 
information obtained from the ONS.  
26Some data from before 2006 are available, but much of the earlier data was collected on a different basis or is 
classified as experimental data so we use 2006 as our base year. As discussed below, we use 2005 MSOA energy 
consumption data to weight our demand shifter.  
27 Although the gas data are weather corrected, unlike the electricity data, DECC (2014, 34) reports that 
“Despite these differences, the combined electricity and gas provide a good indication of overall annual 
household energy consumption in Great Britain at local authority, MSOA/IGZ and LSOA level, due to the 
robustness of the data collections and collation process”. 
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We also explore the quantitative effect of home energy installations on domestic energy 
consumption using the National Energy Efficiency Data-Framework (NEED) End-User 
License File. This provides a panel of household energy (gas & electricity) consumption and 
property characteristics for roughly 3.8 million dwellings in England during the period 2005-
2012 that have had energy performance certificates issued. The data set is anonymized but 
contains property characteristics (property age, type, and size brackets; region; area-based 
deciles for household fuel poverty and neighbourhood deprivation), as well as energy 
efficiency variables (energy efficiency band; gas heating; Economy 7 electricity; new boiler, 
cavity wall and loft installations with year of installation). The public version of the dataset 
however lacks information about households, tenure, and the precise location of dwellings. 
We merge annual energy prices into all these data sets. Energy price measures originate from 
DECC’s Quarterly Energy Prices publications (Table 2.3.3). We use UK average energy 
prices per unit for gas and electricity for customers paying on credit as data for this customer 
group are available for the whole period 2005-2013. Per unit (kWh) costs are generated from 
billing data by assuming a fixed annual consumption. They reflect the prices of all energy 
suppliers and include standing charges and Value Added Tax. We specify our demand shifters 
by taking the weighted average of these national unit costs. Our main results use time 
invariant MSOA-specific weights given by the share of each energy type consumed in the 
MSOA in 2005, i.e. the gas weight for an MSOA equals gas consumption in that MSOA in 
2005 divided by total gas and electricity consumption in that MSOA in 2005. As a robustness 
check we use weights based on the time varying national average share of energy 
consumption for all MSOAs in our sample. In both cases, weighted average prices are 
converted into 2010 prices using the GDP deflator available from Her Majesty’s Treasury 
before we take the natural log. 
Our main right-hand side variables measure two widespread preservation policies: 
Conservation Areas and Listed Buildings. We obtain two shapefiles (for roughly 2008 and 
2012) from Historic England (formerly English Heritage) with details of the spatial scope of 
individual Conservation Areas in England. Because data for some areas are missing in each 
file, we combine the files to minimize gaps but remained short of data for 50 Local 
Authorities (out of 354). Throughout the analysis, we focus solely on the 5,759 MSOAs for 
which we have Conservation Area data. 
A dataset of Listed Buildings is downloaded from the Historic England website. Since the 
data do not identify building type, we cannot easily distinguish between commercial and 
residential Listed Buildings. However, the dataset records three levels of listing which 
denotes their level of historical or architectural interest: according to Historic England Grade 
buildings I are of “exceptional interest”, Grade II* “particular importance” and Grade I of 
“special interest”. 
We construct several time invariant variables capturing the extent of local restrictions on 
domestic buildings at the MSOA- and LPA-level from this information. Our principal 
measures are based on the proportion of residential addresses in each MSOA or LPA that are 
covered by each of the preservation policies. To generate these measures, we first obtain 
counts of residential addresses for each postcode in England from the Postcode Address File 
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(PAF) contained in the 2010 National Statistics Postcode Directory, which we then collapse to 
the MSOA and LPA levels. 
To measure the impact of Listed Buildings, in our baseline specifications we divide the 
number of Grade II Listed Buildings by the total number of residential addresses in each 
MSOA or LPA. This choice reflects our assumption that Grade II Listed Buildings are more 
likely to be residential dwellings than higher grades. As a robustness check we also use the 
total count of Listed Buildings in each MSOA as the numerator (see column (7) of Appendix 
Table 2). 
To measure the impact of Conservation Areas, in our baseline specifications we divide the 
number of residential addresses that lay within Conservation Areas by the total number of 
residential addresses in each MSOA or LPA. This is possible because the postcode centroid 
allows us to identify which individual postcodes are within Conservation Areas and which are 
not. As a robustness check we use a measure based on the share of developed land in each 
MSOA that is within a Conservation Area (see column (6) of Appendix Table 2). The 
denominator in this robustness measure is the area of land in urban or semi-urban use in each 
MSOA, developed using data from the Land Cover Map of Great Britain 1990.  
In general terms, our empirical estimations treat preservation policies as if they were time 
invariant. The justification for this assumption is that new preservation designations in our 
sample period comprise a very small proportion of the stock of Listed Buildings and 
Conservation Areas. Of the 8,349 Conservation Areas in our dataset, 302 (or 3.7%) were 
newly designated in the period 2005-2013 while 5,049 out of 376,025 (or 1.3%) Listed 
Buildings were added to the list in the same period. To ensure that this does not bias or 
attenuate out results we conduct a robustness check where we drop MSOAs that contained a 
newly designated Conservation Area as well as any buildings that were listed after 2005 from 
our counts of Listed Buildings (see column (5) of Appendix Table 2). 
We use a third preservation policy, Green Belts, as a placebo test (see Appendix Table 3). 
Shapefiles for Green Belts are not released as officially-sanctioned data. However, the area of 
land within Green Belts for each Local Authority is released in spreadsheet format by the 
Department for Communities and Local Government. We also obtain a GIS map of Green 
Belts as they existed in 2011 from the website www.sharegeo.ac.uk, and estimate the number 
of residential addresses in land designated as Green Belt at the LPA-level using these two 
data sources.  
Our control variables include a variety of trends and fixed effects. We use the 2001 Census to 
construct a series of share variables normalised by contemporaneous population at the 
MSOA-level: share of residents with degree, share employed, share owner-occupiers, share 
lone parents, share aged 45-59, share aged 60 or more. To take account of the possibility that 
the stock of housing could determine sensitivity of areas to energy prices, we extract 
Valuation Office Agency (VOA) data for the age (share built prior to 1945, between 1945 and 
1964, 1965 and 1982, between 1983 and 1999 and share built after 2000) and type (detached, 
semi-detached, terrace, flat) of housing stock in each MSOA and LPA. These data date from 
2014. We also generate additional time varying controls by allowing for flexible Travel to 
Work Area and household income trends. The latter is based on estimated MSOA household 
41
net income in 2004/5. The choice of this strategy reflects the unavailability of any time 
varying income data at the MSOA-scale. 
In robustness checks, we replace the 2001 Census trends with linear time trends interacted 
with the same share variables calculated using the 2011 Census, as well as the change in the 
same share variables between these two Censuses (see columns (2) and (3) of Appendix Table 
2).  
Finally, in some specifications we control for urban-rural issues on the basis that rural places 
often do not have access to mains gas and will likely have a different mix of domestic energy 
types and exposure to fuel prices. We do so by dropping places where mains gas consumption 
is zero and also those places that were recorded as being in a “sparse” or “village” setting in 
the 2011 Census. We also interact a trend variable with the remaining rural-urban 
classifications, namely: Rural town and fringe; Urban city and town; Urban major 
conurbation; Urban minor conurbation. 
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Appendix Tables 
Appendix Table 1 
Summary Statistics: Additional MSOA Robustness Variables 
Obs.
Mean 
Std. Dev. 
Min. Max. overall between within
Panel data 
Log lag energy price per kWh: alternative weighting 44,149 1.79 0.17 0.01 0.17 1.47 2.00
Log North Sea gas production (million cubic meters) 44,149 10.98 0.28 0.03 0.28 10.55 11.35
Cross-sectional data 
Planning Variables 
Share of LPA dwellings in Green Belt in % 5,665 1.95 4.01  0 36.75
Census 2011 Variables 
Share degree educated in % 5,665 22.42 9.79 3.51 62.62
Share lone parent in % 5,665 2.97 1.36 0.19 9.64
Share owner-occupier in % 5,665 64.54 17.11 7.58 96.53
Share ethnicity white in % 5,665 85.84 18.52  5.62 99.46
Share aged 45-59 in % 5,665 19.50 3.19 2.99 27.84
Share aged 60 or above in % 5,665 22.47 7.45 3.15 57.14
Share Manager, Professional, Assoc. Professional  in % 5,665 40.46 12.72 11.67 83.92
Share employed in % 5,665 47.67 5.91 22.24 72.01
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Appendix Table 2 
Robustness Check: Alternative LHS & RHS Variables 
Dep Var: Log domestic energy 
consumption per person 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)   (8) (9)
Nature of differences from baseline: ---- Sample restriction ---- ---- Trends ---- ------ Planning measures ------ --- Demand shifter --- 
Log one year lagged energy price ൈ Listed 0.0211*** 0.0215*** 0.0160*** 0.0235*** 0.0196*** 0.0267*** 0.0219*** 0.0217*** 0.0187*** 
(0.00494) (0.00454) (0.00430) (0.00458) (0.00433) (0.00394) (0.00431) (0.00546) (0.00390) 
Log one year lagged energy price  0.0197*** 0.0174*** 0.0150*** 0.0145*** 0.0180*** 0.0127*** 0.0167*** 0.0188*** 0.0164*** 
ൈ Conservation Area (0.00404) (0.00384) (0.00387) (0.00377) (0.00367) (0.00326) (0.00366) (0.00462) (0.00362) 
Controls, Fixed Effects and Trends √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Specific change relative to baseline spec: No sample 
restriction 
Weaker 
sample 
restriction  
2011 Census 
trends 
∆2001-2011 
Census trends 
Drops 
preservation 
policies since 
2005 
Share land in 
CA instead of 
share dwellings
All Listed 
Buildings 
instead of 
Grade II 
IV energy price 
interactions 
with north sea 
gas production 
Weight prices 
with national 
energy split  
in 2005 
Observations 41,279 40,805 40,410 40,410 38,784 40,410 40,410 40,410 40,410 
Adj. R-squared 0.946 0.972 0.986 0.986 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.985
Kleibergen-Paap F 4,318
Notes: Standard errors clustered at LPA level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All policy variables are standardised.
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Appendix Table 3 
Robustness Check: Placebo using Green Belt 
Approach: --- Weighted --- --- Stacked --- 
Dep Var:  ------- Log domestic energy consumption per person ------- 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log one year lagged energy price  -0.0024 -0.0024 0.0060 0.0070 
ൈ	Share LPA dwellings in Green Belt (0.00221) (0.0221) (0.00713) (0.00702)
Log one year lagged energy price  0.0200*** 0.0241* 
ൈ	Grade II Listed per 100 dwellings (0.00421) (0.0135)
Log one year lagged energy price  0.0170*** 0.0213** 
ൈ Share dwellings in Conservation Area (0.00378) (0.00901)
Controls, Fixed Effects and Trends √ √ √ √
Observations 40,410 40,410 80,836 80,836
Adj. R-squared 0.985 0.985 0.996 0.996 
Notes: Standard errors clustered at LPA level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All policy variables are 
standardised. Energy prices are lagged by one year. 
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